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ABSTRACT
Imagining Basic Income as a Domestic and International Remedy to Wealth Inequality
By

Christian Davis
Advisor: James Oakes
Has the success of corporate capitalism undermined the neoliberal ideas it
presupposes, leading to the inevitable growth of socialism? While labor unions may
lament the export of jobs, the real issue in today’s increasingly administered and
mechanized economy is the global loss of jobs. James Ferguson has provided a strong
argument that despite the triumphalist narratives of neoliberalism, capitalist development
strategies particularly in South Africa have resulted in concentrated wealth, large
unemployment, and the growth of transfer payments. More importantly, he shows how
traditional critics of capitalism fall short in addressing the issues of a jobless future. For
example, Marxists lack the ability to envision production dissociated from distribution.
Other critics of neoliberalism provide little less than their criticisms, offering no real
remedies. Surveying the sources of poverty and wealth inequality in Southern Africa has
real implications for poverty policy in the US, as there exists a common structural
mechanism in global capitalist relations. The successes and failures of redistribution
models abroad can serve as a useful tool in imagining a future where full employment
becomes more and more of a distant fantasy due to both global trade and automation of
labor. Basic Income Grants have emerged in the political discourse outside of the US in
both the North and South. Likewise, in the aftermath of the global economic crisis of
2008, Conditional Cash Transfers have grown throughout Latin America, Africa, with
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some experimentation even in the US. The success of cash payments worldwide in
efficiently and effectively relieving poverty provides possible rebuttals for those that
claim that handouts create a lazy, unmotivated labor force. It will be imperative for the
US to begin to imagine the more democratic ideals inherent in transfer payments. Can a
political solution based on a distributive economy develop in the US? This paper will
attempt to make a case for such an argument. A look at the structural transformations of
capitalism in the 20th century will reveal how neoclassical, neoliberal and Marxist models
fail to meet the unique economic conditions of the US in the 21st century.
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Wealth inequality and its continued growth in the 21st century is not just a rights
issue but is in fact a threat to the continued growth of capitalist production.1 An
examination of inequality in Southern Africa can and will inform domestic inequality, as
I will argue that the economic structures that produce poverty in Africa and the US are
one in the same. The neoliberal vision that has led global development since the 1980s
has been highly effective in creating wealth but has similarly been blind to the realities of
suffering in the Third World. Neo-Marxists and World-Systems theorists very capably
outline the economic structures that produce inequality and rightly consider capital
accumulation from the periphery to the core of the global economy as the root cause of
poverty. For neoliberals, distributive economics denies individual freedom, initiative to
produce, and social mobility; taxation required for transfer of wealth, limits supply side
investment and therefore growth. However, development of US capital and its effects on
the global economy has not best supported the ideals of freedom at home or abroad, but
instead has resulted in the unintended growth of socialist structures, be they transfer
payments or prison sentences. In order to avoid unpredicted, chaotic structural changes
in capitalist relations, more mindful alternatives must be imagined, most promisingly a
universal basic income, UBI.2 A UBI could guarantee the efficient production of wealth,

1

See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers
our Future (WW Norton & Company, 2012).
2
The Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN.org), defines Basic Income using the following
conditions; Basic Income is 1. Periodic: it is paid at regular intervals (for example every
month), not as a one-off grant 2. Cash payment: it is paid in an appropriate medium of
exchange, allowing those who receive it to decide what they spend it on. It is not,
therefore, paid either in kind (such as food or services) or in vouchers dedicated to a
specific use. 3. Individual: it is paid on an individual basis—and not, for instance, to
households 4. Universal: it is paid to all, without means test. 5. Unconditional: it is paid
without a requirement to work or to demonstrate
willingness-to-work.
1

while guaranteeing as a right, the opportunity for all to participate in global capitalist
relations. It may in fact provide for the ideals of neoliberalism by providing a stronger
foundation for the ideals of liberty, social mobility, and individual initiative. At worst it
can prevent tendencies toward less healthy socialization in the form of nationalization
and malign corrections in wealth inequality through war or crime.
The Causes of African Poverty; International Relations as Capitalist Relations
We in “the West” are consistently confronted with images of poverty from the
underdeveloped world, yet rarely does the journalistic dialogue shift from that of
humanitarian aid to the root causes of such poverty. Understanding how global
economic relations work in contributing to or the alleviation of poverty would be a more
pragmatic approach. Though Development Theory has certainly gone out of favor, it is
important to revisit such a model as its successor, Globalization, takes up much of the
same forms under a new name.3 Work on the periodization of capitalism will reveal the
importance of the household and household demand in the development of capitalist
markets. It also underscores the role of primitive accumulation, both arenas that have
been neglected in the investment strategies of the World Bank and IMF. Most
importantly we find that International Relations are capitalist relations. In the global
economy, accumulation of capital transcends the role of states, creating inequalities of
wealth that apply as much to the Third World as working-class Americans.

Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the
Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, with a new prologue.
Vol. 1. (Univ of California Press; 2011).
3
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A large body of empirical work seeks to explain the “underdevelopment” of many
African states through the undeniably injurious history of slavery and colonialism.4 Such
considerations are necessary but do not adequately explain the continued persistence of
poverty in Africa, a poverty that has endured despite the promises of capitalist economic
development. Unfortunately, as Branwen Gruffyydd Jones points out, International
Relations and Development Studies have failed to adequately examine global capitalist
structures, instead focusing on local agency and issues of statehood.5 Development
Studies perpetuate the Modernization Theory that outlines a binary system of traditional
and modern societies. The traditional society under such a model consists of a
subsistence-based agricultural economy, kinship-based politics that emerge from large
extended family bonds that are highly stratified, and a largely impoverished low-skill
work force; while the modern “developed” model consists of an industrialized economy
with working capital, pluralist political systems, and smaller nuclear family relations that
are highly skilled and flexible in the labor market, consuming high levels of material
goods.6 Such a model tends to influence our reactions to poverty and purport a kind of
timelessness to capitalism, or wrongly attribute development to the growth of trade.
Developing economies in Africa are then treated more like juvenile states that need
intervention from the paternalistic developed states, including most recently, neo-liberal
solutions.7 However, imagining local poverty as crises of statehood denies both the
4

See Grier (1999); Englebert (2000), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002);
Bertocchi and Canova (2002), Lange (2004).
Branwen Gruffydd Jones, "Africa and the poverty of international relations," Third
World Quarterly 26, no. 6 (2005): 987.
6 Ibid., 988.
7
The World Bank’s response to the dire economic condition in Mozambique in the 1990s
provides a clear example of the West working to help alleviate poverty in rural areas
5
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globally structured causes of poverty in African states and our understanding of how
successful capitalist states formed in the West in the first place. Even if we can find a
path for economic development that can transition developing economies into robust
capitalist economies, adopting Kuznet’s theory of capitalism’s contribution to latent but
eventual growth in wealth equality, would it not be worth examining the conditions of
transition to capitalism in Europe and apply that knowledge?
The neoliberal approach assumes that Smithian economic growth, self-sustaining
through the guidance of the invisible hand, will naturally progress when unfettered by the
interference of state imposed barriers, e.g. taxes, tariffs, rents, nationalization. James
Livingston nicely summarizes the economic philosophy that currently informs US and
global policy through the following four assumptions; that growth is the result of private
investment in the free market, that such capital investments are funded by household
savings and corporate profits; social mobility, personal initiative, and individual freedom
are best achieved through said growth in the free market, as the distribution of resources
is not fettered by the state. This means that tax cuts should support higher savings and
profits through greater investment.8 So we find that despite the acclaim of free market
forces, the political community maintains particular property relations that do in fact
redistribute income. Brenner’s definition of social-property relations is useful here;
“relations among direct producers, relations among exploiters, and relations between
exploiter and direct producers, that taken together, make possible/specify the regular

through the state via Trans National Corporations, resulting in unequal exchange rather
than a means to production.
8
James Livingston, Against Thrift: Why Consumer Culture is Good for the Economy, the
Environment, and Your Soul (Basic Books, 2011).

4

access of individuals and families to the means of production (land, labour, tools) and/or
the social product per se.”9 Is it possible that the neoliberal model of the international
economy is based on ahistorical fantasies about Smith’s free market? Brenner makes a
strong case that the growth of towns or trade or merchant capital alone did not constitute
the break from the feudal social property relations. What constituted capitalist property
relations was the move away from subsistence to market dependence in the agricultural
sector.10 In fact, we can find examples where increased trade resulted in increased
economic coercion, such as when the demands of early towns and cities in Western
Europe helped to entrench feudal bonds in Eastern Europe and continued enslavement in
the southern US. If capitalist social property relations are constituted by market
dependence free of coercion, and we look at the classical model of investment based
growth as leading to excesses in capital that in turn spur income inequality rather than the
“lifting of all boats”, then we have a material history that begs to examine a politics that
considers guaranteed income as a right for all. As the periphery becomes less defined by
national borders and as global and national wealth inequality widens, basic income would
provide a right to participate in the system in which one is dependent whether they are the
working poor in the US or the unemployed in Namibia. Property relations, real wages,
household production, and primitive accumulation all provide insights into how England
made its transition to a productive capitalist economy. Application of such conditions to
developing nations may in fact reveal why some economies are more successful than
others in making such a transition.

9

Brenner, “Property and Progress; Where Adam Smith went Wrong” (2007).
Ibid.

10

5

In The Myth of 1648 Benno Teschke highlights the shortcomings of IR theories
while addressing the transition debates. Teschke takes great pains to argue that absolutist
states, though appearing modern in their apparent political unity, especially through their
ability to negotiate treaties such as that of Westphalia in 1648, were not modern capitalist
states and therefore not historically the beginning of international relations. He claims
that modern international relations are relations of capitalism, and thus did not develop in
one historical moment, but evolved over time as capitalism developed first in England,
later spreading into northern and Western Europe, and eventually into the periphery.
According to Teschke, one cannot ascribe the initial wealth disparity found in the WorldSystems theory to capitalist exploitation because the initial relations were rather merchant
capital relations. As mercantilist trade did not create wealth, but rather exploited profit
through trade, Teschke would argue that modern international relations were not being
practiced and would not be until old political forms met their end in World War I. In
examining the persistence of poverty in Southern Africa, it would be helpful to dispel the
myth that all market relations are capitalist relations. Thus we can see that neoliberal
policies may or may not stimulate effective transitions to strong capitalist structures.
Teschke seeks to prove that mercantilist trade in the early modern world was
simply an extension of medieval practices. In addition he makes the bold claim that it,
“…not only failed to establish a new logic of international economic relations… …it did
not even generate any unintended consequences which would have pushed this system in
the direction of modern capitalism and thus modern international relations”.11 Teschke is
satisfied with an acknowledgment from Dobb on the matter. He rightly points to how
11

Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern
International Relations (Verso: 2003), 205.
6

trade brought a revival of serfdom in Eastern Europe and slavery in the South. There are
many possible outcomes of trade and as Dobb would argue, trade does not equate to
capitalism.12 However, one of the apparent outcomes as argued in the William’s thesis,
most persuasively by Barbara Solow, is that the resulting enterprises did create the
possibility of primitive accumulation.13 As Marx points out, “Britain was accumulating
great wealth from the triangular trade. The increase of consumption goods called forth
by that trade inevitably drew in its train the development of the productive power of the
country. This industrial expansion required finance. What man in the first three-quarters
of the eighteenth century was better able to afford the ready capital than a West-Indian
sugar planter or a Liverpool slave trader?”14 Even though mercantilist practices were not
capitalist, the accumulation of wealth from the periphery to developed states was an
important component in the development of international capitalist relations as it
provided the necessary primitive accumulation of capital.15 This is no small point that is
problematic for the understanding of modern international relations. The accumulation of
wealth from the periphery to the core as described in Wallerstein’s world-systems theory
continues to be of relevance when explaining the success or lack thereof in transitions to
capitalist systems.16 Likewise developing nations, or more precisely local rural
economies, have no modern equivalent in primitive accumulation other than in the form
of foreign investment, investment that history has shown can be ruthlessly burdensome.

12

Maurice Dobb, "Studies in the Development of Capitalism" (1948).
Barbara L. Solow, "Caribbean slavery and British growth: the Eric Williams
hypothesis," Journal of development economics 17, no. 1 (1985), 99-115.
14
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The communist manifesto. (Penguin, 2002), 80.
15
see Eric Williams, Capitalism and slavery (UNC Press Books, 2014).
16 Wallerstein, “After Development and Globalization, what?” Social Forces 83, no. 3
(2005), 1264-1265.
13
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To deny that primitive accumulation was not an important aspect in the development of
industrial-capitalism obscures an important aspect of development, one that has been
withheld from the non-Western world. Without the necessary local accumulation of
capital in Africa, it will not come as a surprise that the injection of capital from the West
for development projects did not solve poverty issues in Africa, but even contributed to
decreases in wealth and increases in wealth inequality.17 As Jones points out, “…the
West developed at the expense of the Third World, producing underdevelopment as the
other side of the coin of development… … Rather than bringing the assumed benefits of
injection of capital and technology to assist the development of the Third World, foreign
capital in the form of TNCs was shown to exploit their advantages by gaining from the
availability of cheap labour-power and raw materials, while exporting the profits to the
metropole and manipulating costs, tax and profits through transfer pricing.”18 Not only
has foreign capital failed to alleviate poverty, but its benefits have fallen to a small
minority, entrenching class divides and factionalism.19 Thus social stratification, which
was considered a natural state in Development theory, was in actuality a result of the
global economic structure.
When considering periodization of capitalism in the West, we also find the
argument that the household, not mercantilist trade, provided the basis for a consumer
market of goods beyond basic necessities.20 Can understanding the changing property
relations of 17th century England help us to better evaluate the success of unconditional
17

See Biersteker (1978), Evans (1979), Villamil (1979), Jones (2006). p 34.
Branwen Gruffydd Jones, Explaining Global Poverty: A Critical Realist Approach,
(Routledge, 2007), 34.
19
Ibid.
20
Jan De Vries De Vries, The Industrious Revolution: Consumer Behavior and the
Household Economy, 1650 to the present (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
18

8

cash grants in Namibia? I believe so, especially if we value the growth of a domestic
market and do not simply view development through the lens of export trade. The role of
the pre-industrial household economy as the source of initial capitalist growth justifies a
further examination. Jan de Vries describes an “Industrious Revolution” that eventually
produced household demand for what he labels, Z-commodities, goods that cannot be
purchased efficiently on the market alone but require some kind of domestic inputs.21 The
industrious activity within the household in turn pushed the supply and demand of
products of household consumption and proto-industry. This self-interest of the family,
places the household not only as a driver for the emergence of the industrial economy,
but for the self-determined emergence of the accompanying breadwinner household.
The premise of the Industrious Revolution requires de Vries to confront some
long-held assumptions, specifically about the nature of consumption and the catalysts of
change in the consumer household. He challenges social scientific models, as provided
by the Frankfurt school for example, that see consumerism leading to social decay,
creating a product similar to Max Weber’s Genussmensch ohne Herz in the “onedimensional man”; this, “alienated worker, once wrenched by capitalism from a
traditional culture, loses all self-control and develops a voracious appetite for goods and
an insatiable need for fantasy, distraction and ostentatious play.”22 However, de Vries
questions this lamenting of consumer culture, and points to the industrious revolution as a
possible earlier periodization of consumption based upon self-interest. As opposed to the
“Old Luxuries” which strove for grandeur unobtainable by the vast majority of the
population, the “[New Luxuries] served more to communicate cultural meaning,
21
22

Ibid.
Ibid.,41.
9

permitting reciprocal relations- a kind of sociability- among participants in society.”23
The New Luxuries were therefore not drains upon the masses, but incentivizing social
rewards for increased production and consumption technologies in the household. It was,
according to de Vries, the shared cultural desire for Z-commodities that inspired the
agricultural specialization, proto-industrial production, wage labor, and commercial
service that would help to overcome the initial high costs of market transactions. It is
not the demise of culture, but rather the expansion of cultural influence to the masses that
brings about a modern economy of growth. As such, it was not technological innovation
or political authority that imposed the new model, but rather a development of work
performed out the self-interest of the household. As we have seen, the neoliberal policies
of the 80s and 90s, that sought to devalue the currencies of the global South with an eye
toward export production, enforced what we could call the “Old Luxuries” of today,
products for First-World consumption. Rather than supporting a growing domestic
market where average households could willingly and freely enter into the market,
decreases in the value of local currencies dis-incentivized participation in the market as
depressed currencies led to high prices. Such changes are described by local experience
in Mozambique, a state often hailed as the model success story for neoliberal policy.
…before during the colonial period, you could go and take fifteen kilos of cashew
to the shop, and receive two and a half esucodos, and these tow and a half man,
trousers for the children and some other things, like cooking oil – with this tow
and a half escudos. But now, taking fifteen kilos of cashew to the shop, you

23

Ibid., 45.
10

could get more or less 150,000 meticais. But these 150,000 meticais are not
enough to buy these things, which you could buy with two and a half escudos…
… So someone to buy a bar of soap, for example, which costs, 10,000 meticais,
you have to take a lot of produce, because when you take one kilo it is not enough
to buy a bar of soap. Because the price of a kilo of groundnut is very low, so you
have to take many kilos of groundnut in order to be able to buy just one bar of
soap.24

Other contributors to the transition debates, such as Robert Allen, argue that
rather than enclosure acts leading to market-oriented production in the agricultural
sphere, just the opposite took place; farmers, enamored by the ever expanding selection
of goods, looked for ways to produce efficiently for the market in an attempt to gain more
purchasing power.25 If we can entertain such notions, not only do the flaws of colonial
policy become more apparent, such as those that assumed taxation would incentivize
would subsistence farmers to join the market economy, but we also see that export
oriented neo-liberal policies have not supported the freedom and development of wealth
in the developing world. They rather simply provide for the accumulation of capital in
the developed world. If not for the moral dilemma of giving away money, nonconditional cash grants would be seen clearly for what they can provide; an initial supply
of primitive capital in the hands of household producers and the access to partake in
demand.

24

Jones, Explaining Global Poverty, 174.
Robert C. Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
25
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The Growth of US Capital
The so-called humanitarian efforts on behalf of Western powers often come with
reciprocal obligations, leading those like Jones to describe neoliberal policy as neocolonialism. In the Neo-Marxian view, Dependency theory, and Wallerstein’s WorldSstems theory, the periphery and semi-periphery contribute to the accumulation of capital
for the core. One might argue that the growth of capital has served as a constraint upon
endogenous growth, as local supplies of “New Luxuries” are disregarded in the push to
produce the “Old Luxuries” for developed markets. Additionally, the core and periphery
are not necessarily distinguished through national boundaries in the global economy.
Therefore, the same structures that are responsible for global inequality, between the
North and South per se, are fueling national inequality in the US. The structural changes
that led to the mass export of capital were not just a product of the debt crises of the
1970s, though this is a significant history that will be addressed. One must look first to
rise of corporate capitalism in the late 19th and early 20th century. Here we find that the
growth of US capital was also the beginning of US economic imperialism. Interestingly,
we similarly find that such structural changes were not simply a result of Laissez Faire
economics, but a politics of cooperation between labor, capital, and government.
In The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916, Martin J.
Sklar proposes that, beginning in 1890 with the passage of the Sherman Anti-trust Act
until Wilson’s first term with the creation of the Federal Reserve and the Federal Trade
Commission, a corporate-capitalist movement served to transform the political-economic
order of the US from proprietary competitive-capitalism to corporate-capitalism. The rise

12

of corporate power in administering markets was the result of a social movement that
transcended the traditional socio-economic boundaries of pro-corporate and procompetition camps. Nor did this revolutionary transformation take place behind the
scenes. The regulatory actions under Roosevelt, Taft, or even Wilson were not latent
responses to corporate power, but the product of debate and actions not only against
monopolistic oppression but also inclusive of small-producers fears of competition,
labor’s struggle for representation, and the political ideology of populists, socialists, and
progressives alike. It was not an inevitable result of some kind of economic evolution.
As Sklar states, “The passage of capitalism from its competitive stage to its corporate
stage… …therefore was not simply a matter of submission to “objective” laws of
economic evolution… Rather, their advocacy of changes in the law, policy, and
government was, like the corporate reorganization of property and market relations itself,
an integral component of the social-political movements effecting the corporate
reconstruction of American capitalism.”26 While the anti-trust debates of the early 20th
century characterize the ideology, Sklar presents what he calls corporate-liberalism as the
outcome of the progressive movement as defined through statist terms by Roosevelt, nonstatist judicial regulation by Taft, and a non-statist regulatory solution under Wilson.

Sklar examines the transformation of American capitalism through the lens of the
judicial, legislative, and executive actions of the period. The judicial interpretation of the
Sherman Act serves to portray the progression of corporate-capitalism on a non-linear
trajectory as the courts initially, from 1890-1897, interpreted the Sherman Act through a
26

Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916,
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 12.
13

common law lens that protected the property rights of corporations so long as the
administration of markets e.g. price fixing, were not deemed unreasonable. It was not
until 1911 that the court renewed its commitment to categorizing reasonable versus
unreasonable restrictions of competition after the Harlan led court refused to do so. The
Rule of Reason decisions of 1911, “embodied the policy of allocating to private parties
the primary role, the initiative, in regulating the market, and to government, through
executive oversight and judicial process, a secondary reactive role.”27
Sklar examines the distaste for the Supreme Court rulings regarding the Sherman
Act on behalf of “virtually every organized group in the marketplace.” His detailed,
impressive work on the legislative debate, centered on the attempted passage of the
Hepburn bill, creates a sound basis for his claim that the move towards a progressive
accommodation of corporate-capitalism spanned class and politics. According to Sklar,
“No more than large-corporate capitalists did trade unionists or small producers (whether
farmers, manufacturers, or merchants) want to be bound by the choices dictated by the
Supreme Court, namely, either unrestricted competition or statist direction.”28 His
treatment of the bill likewise revealed fascinating aspects of Roosevelt’s political
strategy, but more importantly exposed the political disapproval of a statist agenda that
allocated a senior partnership in business to the public sector. Sklar shows how even
Roosevelt’s commissioner at the Bureau of Corporations, Herbert Knox Smith was
uneasy with the reach of executive power as envisioned by Roosevelt. To generalize,
American people wanted a form of state regulation that maintained a traditional yet
evolving ideal of natural-liberty. It is in his assessment of the executive in which one
27
28

Ibid., 169.
Ibid., 203.
14

finds the clear distinctions between the three Progressive administrations of Roosevelt,
Taft, and Wilson; the later finally able to establish a regulatory agency that, while
providing the private sector freedom in market administration, had sufficient power along
with the judiciary to guide and regulate corporate-capitalism. “… the corporate-liberal
outlook went with the older American grain in being economic-determinist, acquisitive,
materialist, instrumentalist, pragmatic, simultaneously idealist, altruist, and moralist –
almost, one might say, latter-day Emersonian and Whitmanesque in spirit.”29 The
resulting reorganization of government-market relations not only set the political terms of
debate for the following century but, “…established the fundamental conditions of…
…the mass culture society and also as the organizational or bureaucratic society with its
concomitant rise of a professional, managerial, and technical middle class.”30
Sklar’s periodization of corporate capitalism from 1890 to 1916 is the concurrent
rise of US capital from which economic imperialism arose as a solution to the capital
crises experienced in industrial competition. He argues the theory of modern capitalist
imperialism as the result of surplus was not simply a Marxist theory but an inherently
American ideal. He points to Conant and Reinsch who formulated the “Open Door”
strategy that proposed what would be considered a rather neoliberal idea today, that
global investment could bring economic cooperation and serve as a tool of diplomacy. In
an administered market, surpluses in capital should be mitigated lest they bring
diminishing returns. Global investment found a home for such surplus. Likewise global
capital investment overseas could then be seen as a new form of progress, bringing

29
30

Ibid., 437.
Ibid.
15

republican ideas to the underdeveloped world; he offers the image of a new “West”
coinciding with the culmination of continental western expansion.
Thus in Sklar we find some key points in understanding globalization and wealth
inequality. We see that economic forces do not work independently, but are dependent
upon the social, political forces that establish the “rules of the game”. In this case, the
progressive movement that resulted eventually in Wilsonian liberalism, providing a path
for the inevitable growth and conglomeration of big business through a non-statist
regulatory role for government. Thus labor and management were guaranteed a piece of
the pie, providing for a strong middle class in the subsequent years. Critics of Wilsonian
liberalism feared that the states secondary role in regulation would lead to a state
dominated by corporate interests. Already in 1886, Santa Clara redefined the corporation
as having certain rights of personhood at least concerning the 5th and 14th Amendments.
By 2010 Citizens United guaranteed freedom of speech to corporations, perhaps the most
symptomatic sign that Roosevelt was justified in his statist beliefs. However, through
such a restructuring and administration of markets, the US was able to initiate the most
equitable period of its history while maintaining strong economic growth from the end of
World War II to the 1970s. Thus one is confronted with the question, what changed in
the 1970s that brought an end to the golden age of the American middle class?
One response would argue that the US too often sacrificed it own economic
interests in the post World War II era for interests of the state department’s global
strategic policy. Such policies were then replayed in the post-Cold War Era in the

16

interests and hopes of the financial industry.31 As the US sought to spread its influence
around the globe in the face of the threat of Communist expansion, ever increasing
numbers of US dollars found their way overseas. Beginning with the Marshall Plan, US
investment abroad in Germany and Japan subsidized production that would undercut US
industry, beginning the eventual transition of the US from a net exporter of goods to a net
exporter of debt. With the dollar tied to the gold standard, the export of US capital was
limited as any nation could “cash-in” its dollar supply for gold. Eventually, through the
Bretton Woods agreement, Nixon freed the dollar from the gold reserves, allowing it to
float on the free market. Now debt held by foreigners would come in the form of
Treasury Notes. Thus the US was able to establish its currency as the global reserve
currency, achieving its geopolitical strategic interests at the cost of the manufacturing
sector. The oil crisis of the 1970s, combined with the devaluation of the dollar lead to
increases in oil prices. The cost of oil was felt hardest by Europe and Japan, as the US
funneled the OPEC “petro-dollars” back into the US through arms sales and finance,
fueling the supply of global capital.32 Therefore we find the roots of inequality in the
developing world and in developed nations linked. US manufacture was “cannibalized”
for the sake of a future of finance as US debt was leveraged as a tool for global strategic
interests, propelling speculative investment in Third World markets and creating the
newest version of colonialism through neo-liberal ideology.33 Financially driven
investment looked to volume of trade for short term-minded growth rather than investing

31

Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in
the Seventies (Yale University Press, 2010).
32
Jones, Explaining Global Poverty, 158.
33
Michael Hudson, Super Imperialism-New Edition: The Origin and Fundamentals of US
World Dominance (Pluto Press, 2003), 342; cited by Jones, 158.
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in long-term growth for developing nations. The same form of speculative investment
fueled the housing bubble of 2007 and 2008 in the US, leading to greater inequalities in
wealth. Stein calls it “cannibalistic”, Gowan prefers the term, “parasitic”. Either way, it
is accumulation based on future claims, not a source of new production.34 The excess
capital of the 70s found its way to the solving the liquidity crisis in developing nations
under the new neoliberal ideals of “globalization” beginning in the 80s.35
The resurgence of growing income inequality in the US and neoliberal trade
policies of globalization have correlating origins in the late 1970s and 1980s. NeoMarxists and World-Systems theorists alike would call it the continuation of
accumulation through dispossession. Federal Reserve chairman under Carter and Regan,
Paul Volker, initiated a response to the stagflation crisis of the 70s that created the
conditions of the neoliberal, globalization policies of the last thirty years. Interest rates
hikes and the subsequent demand for dollars, created an artificially strong dollar, which
lead to crises in the Third World. Those developing nations were often largely dependent
on single commodity exports. The high dollar drove down commodity prices while
simultaneously increasing debt burdens. It was through these financial crises that the
terms of negotiation subordinated local interests for the demands of global accumulation
as negotiated through the IMF and World Bank.36 Therefore we find numerous examples
of seemingly capitalist relations that are actual models of pre-capitalist relations where
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the economy of the periphery is unable to transition, but rather serves as a dependent state
providing accumulation for the core.37
Joseph Stiglitz, while advising Clinton stated, “We in the Clinton administration
did not have a vision of a new post-Cold War international order, but the business and
financial community did: they saw new opportunities for profits.”38 Soon the experience
of steel and autoworkers, those that had witnessed their industries undermined by
German and Japanese imports, would be shared with the rest of the manufacturing sector.
With the signing of NAFTA, domestic capital began to be exported in greater amounts
into Mexico and later East Asia. In 1996, $240 billion in private capital flooded
developing countries.39 When Mexico faced a liquidity crisis in 1994 and later when East
Asian markets began to suffer from the neoliberal conditions of borrowing, in both cases,
the answer provided by the US was not far from the patterns of the Cold War. The US
acted alone as the world’s central bank, lending as needed. According to Stein, the Fed
cut interest rates twice to prop up the “global order”.40 “As Asian exports to the United
States rose to facilitate debt payments, more and more US apparel plants closed their
doors and moved to Mexico, Pakistan, or China, where wages were lower.”41 Stein
argues it was the Fed’s low interest rates that drove the growing import market allowing
for a ballooning trade deficit that would grow from $198 billion in 1997 to $415 by
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2000.42 While the financial world reaped the rewards, it was the beginning of a long
decline in manufacturing jobs in the US, a sector that has been widely replaced by
services. Such a growth in the service sector has contributed to greater wealth
inequality.43 Even if globalization effectively brings down the real price of certain goods,
the service sector has been proven to have greater wage inequality than manufacturing.44
Similarly, the poorest and even middle class Americans have not shared in the benefits of
booming financial markets.
It is clear that surplus capital in the US led to speculative investment in
developing countries. When those debts could not be paid, US debt served as the reserve
currency, as the Federal Reserve kept rates low. The US market, with its healthy
consumer appetite, would support the growth of the developing world. In the end, the
billionaires benefited and manufacturing was eclipsed by the service industry. As
Picketty warns, “If you have free trade and free circulation of capital and people but
destroy the social state and all forms of progressive taxation, the temptations of defensive
nationalism and identity politics will likely grow stronger and stronger in both Europe
and the United States.”45 The neoliberal conditions of development require the
devaluation of currency, privatization of industry, and tax policy that encourages capital
investment at the expense of labor. It therefore sacrifices social provision for private
gain, ignoring demand in favor of supply-side goals, transferring resources from
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consumers to investors.46 Cheap labor as the source of wealth may in fact prevent
transition, instead creating dependency on the core markets that results in a race to the
bottom.47 Wallerstein would point out that it is unreasonable to expect that all nations
will achieve a level of economic development as that of Denmark and that gains made in
the semi-periphery come at the cost of the core.48 Milanovic’s data, which will be
examined further in this work, gives clear evidence that the overall increases of global
wealth have come at the expense of the lower middle class of wealthy nations. But
World-Systems theorists would point out that the race to the bottom will eventually come
to an end as we run out of rural areas in which cheap labor can be exploited, a process
Wallerstein calls de-ruralization.49 He predicts a systems collapse. Successful transitions
to capitalist relations can be attributed to various factors including, primitive
accumulation, strong wages and the resulting consumer demand, the power of labor to
negotiate contract, and as we saw in Sklar’s work, social, political, cultural structures
needed to administer the market. Basic income may be the easiest way to address such
obstacles under the current neoliberal political environment with the least disruption to
the productivity of the market while increasing local consumption, labor power, and
political action.
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Wealth Inequality in the Global economy
As globalization progresses and the relations of states become more capitalistic,
the divisions in society become less dependent upon nationhood and more divided
between classes. The costs of production are exported, promoting the growth of capital
while lowering consumer prices. However, as we are currently witnessing in the US,
eventually real wages decrease, as the savings provided by cheap imported goods are
eclipsed by a shrinking consumer base. Within even the wealthiest state, e.g. Germany
and the United States, up to a third of the population has zero net wealth or less.50 Under
the Kuznets hypothesis, wealth inequality was a product of low wage economies’
transition to more productive industrial economies, but eventually developed economies
with higher outputs would experience a reduction of wealth inequality, as did the US
from the 1950s to the 1970s.51 Wealth inequality was therefore a temporary if necessary
trend in the development model. However, since the 1980s we have seen a hiccup in the
Kuznets trend in the US in which inequality has continued to steadily rise, ranging close
to levels seen in 1933, even despite social welfare programs and transfer payments that
were non-existent before the Great Depression. The combined forces of technological
automation and globalization and the subsequent stagnation of wages over the last thirty
years has led to a groundswell of populism unseen since the days of the robber barons.
Candidates of both parties in the 2016 election cycle, through Bernie Sanders and Donald
Trump, appealed to US skepticism of the global economic benefits for average
Americans. Added to this picture, Silicon Valley, perhaps the one prodigy of the US
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economy outside of the realm of finance, warns how those jobs, if not shipped overseas,
will be lost to automation.52 For these reasons and others, the idea of a BIG is not simply
a “Third World” solution. However, the imagination needed to conceptualize a basic
income in Southern Africa can help us better understand a role in such thinking and
political discourse in the US.
In strictly macroeconomic terms, the neo-liberals are correct; globalization,
consisting of value added supply chains, has provided efficiency of production that has
produced clear gains in wealth for the global population.53 From 1988 to 2008, the
largest gains in global real income have taken place for people around the 50th percentile
and the top one percentile. While the eightieth percentile experienced the lowest gains, a
population that has seen net gains of zero or less. This group is the lower middle class of
Western nations.54 Of the one percent that has seen cumulative gains of nearly 70% over
this span, 12% are US citizens. These trends have not showed signs of reversing and can
clearly show how total gains around the world or even within the US are possible while
decreases in wealth play out for working class Americans. An understanding of how
American corporate capitalism played out on the world stage from the 1980s to present
should inform the way we imagine the future.
There is a clear correlation between the supply side economics instituted under
Reagan and his successors and increases in wealth inequality. Picketty gives an
explanation for such a correlation in his book, Capital. He rejects Kuznet’s theory that
states’ initial inequalities experienced under industrialization eventually decrease as
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wealth increases, pointing to the equality and economic growth from the post-war era.
Picketty argues that “normal” capitalist conditions lead to inequality and that the period
from 1950 to the 1970s was the exception not the rule. Both malign and benign forces
can mitigate typical inequality, e.g., war and its resulting taxation or social programs of
the New Deal leading to transfers of wealth. Milanovic is critical of Picketty’s
assessment as it fails to recognize examples where capitalism resulted in decreases in
inequality regardless of said malign or benign forces. What they both agree upon is the
excess of capital as a key contributing factor to the growing inequality of the last thirty
years. Milanovic takes a somewhat neoclassical outlook, focusing on the role of
technology. He likens the Information Revolution to the Industrial Revolution where
new wealth formation created disparities in income, as “A rise in the average income
opens the “space” for a rise in inequality.”55 Likewise the globalization of capital led to
pro-rich policies such as a capital gains tax rate that was lower than that of labor.
Milanovic argues that this was policy largely made out of necessity as capital became
more fluid and difficult to tax in the global marketplace, thus exacerbating wealth
inequality.56 All in all, it is not difficult to see that the opening of China in the 1980s
provided an enormous pool of low-wage labor that eventually enabled the production of
low-cost capital goods. These capital goods could then be used to automate production in
high wage countries. Such technology would then need to be serviced, designed, and
operated by high-wage, highly skilled labor. Milanovic compares this cycle to Robert
Allen’s hypothesis that credits high wages in pre-industrial England to the resulting
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technological changes that sought to reduce the cost of production, the result being
similar wage inequalities.
Perhaps one of the best examples of global corporate practices that embody much
of the current dilemma of globalization and inequality is that of Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart
braved new territory in logistical efficiency, exploiting labor and suppliers alike in its
explosive race to the top of market share. Nelson Lichtenstein reveals what he calls the
“Walmartization” of America in The Retail Revolution.57 He describes how Sam Walton
and his Wal-mart empire bucked against progressive liberalism in the second half of the
twentieth century. Walton succeeded in taking up a commercialization model where the
shipping, distribution, retail, and eventually the manufacture of goods were controlled
with cost reductions impressed upon each step of the supply chain. He was able to
bypass the old distribution warehouses of the first generation box stores with distribution
centers that were connected via satellite to real-time sales in the stores. This was done
through the universal application of a new technology, bar codes. Eventually Wal-Mart
knew more about the items it was selling than the companies own representatives and
was able to buy on their own terms for fear of losing Wal-Mart’s vast market share.
Along with effective use of new technology and despite its “made in the USA” marketing
campaigns, Wal-Mart looked to source its products from a low-wage manufacturing
economy abroad, namely China. Workers at Wal-Mart in the US were paid minimum
and even sub-minumbum wages, often subsidized by federal and state social programs,
mainly food stamps. Hours were often less than forty hours a week for hourly workers
while salaried workers complained of working 60-hour weeks without overtime benefits.
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Because of this, Wal-Mart had high employee turnover, becoming a catchall for
temporary employment or secondary earners in financial distress.
The result of Wal-Mart’s success had an effect across many sectors. Lichtenstein
points to the willingness of Wal-Mart to open stores with minimal population density
requirements. One town was so small that, like many other examples of Main Street
America, its stores were put out of business. When Wal-Mart pulled out of the town,
shuttering its own doors, the town literally ceased to exist. Walmartization is felt not
only on Main Street, but effects human resourcing in all realms of retail, including other
large box stores that must remain competitive. While Wal-Mart was initially proud of its
“made in the USA” products, American manufacturing was bypassed in favor of the low
wage products from abroad. Wal-Mart pressure on its employees not to unionize has left
a large percentage of the retail service sector out of the global supply chain of wealth and
therefore unable to participate in the relative gains in spending power. For the rest of the
country, the fact that wages have been stagnating since 1980 relative to inflation is less
apparent as retail costs remain low.58 But what about sectors of the economy that cannot
be similarly commercialized? Here we find the real value of the dollar diminished, in
healthcare, transportation, education, and housing. Is it a coincidence that these sectors
provide are our greatest discourse on equality, justice, and human rights? Wal-Mart
provides a clear example of how supply-side politics have created an amazingly
successful business at the cost of equality. Though these global processes, we have an
enormous growth in capital without the matching growth in wages, at least for workingclass Americans. A basic income could allow a business like Wal-Mart to continue
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current practices, but could as serve as a tool in regulating labor. Whatever our
sympathies or antipathies may be toward Wal-mart, a BI could provide a gentle support
for labor, providing added power in negotiating contracts with or without a union.
If globalization and automation will create the most efficient means of production
in the history of human civilization, its benefits must lift all boats. Too often those on the
left blame the loss of jobs or the demise of labor unions. Hillary Clinton and Donald
Trump both promised to create jobs as an answer to those that are suffering from under
and unemployment in the US. Andy Stern, the former head of the Service Employees
International Union had given up on seeing a strong resurgent union movement.59 If one
imagines economic growth partitioned into the two sectors of capital and wages, we find
that capital growth over the last thirty years has largely outpaced that of wages.60 Perhaps
this had been true of most of the twentieth century, but as Conant explain, this capital
found its way into foreign investment. As incomes in manufacturing economies such as
China begin to converge with those of developed states, the cost offsets to consumers
shrink, leaving Middle America feeling neglected and poor. The increased wages in
China means one of two options. Business can move to the next developing nation e.g.,
Vietnam, until its economy begins a shift from investment spending to consumption
spending, warranting another move (Wallerstein’s race to the bottom), until the global
middle class may or may not emerge. Or, business can take advantage of the inexpensive
production of capital goods, specifically those that enable automation of labor, which
reduce or eliminate the need for low-skilled labor. Either way, it is clear that the idea that
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we can look to jobs as an answer in our political discourse is an anachronistic dream. We
must find new ways of imagining equality in the 21st century economy. That includes
imagining how the growth of household incomes can maintain balance with the growth of
capital. In the global-techno economy, the classical model of investment spending
creating jobs for the household becomes less and less feasible. How can we keep the
benefits of the global supply chain and low labor cost while maintaining equanimity and
human freedom?
Milanovic proposes five possible solutions to address wealth inequality.61 He first
looks to taxation and redistribution. While this is perhaps the most apparent approach,
the nature of capital in the 21st century has proven difficult tax. One can look to GE as a
clear example. In the 1950s GE produced consumer goods for the domestic market,
employing hundreds of thousands of employees and paying millions in taxes. Today GE
focuses on producing capital goods such as wind turbines for export; such offshore
accounts pay little to no taxes to the US government. In 2010 GE made over 14 billion in
profits, yet paid zero in US taxes.62 James Livingston points out for the New York Times
that current tax structures focus on wages rather than capital or corporate profits,
exacerbating the distribution problem in the US and leading to further inequality.63
Picketty states that in ideal world, we would have a global capital gains tax, though he
admits it is currently a utopian dream.64 Secondly Milanovic looks to education’s role as

Milanovic, 115.
Livingston, Livingston, James. "If Companies Are People..." New York Times, April
15, 2013, A19(L). Academic OneFile (accessed November 26, 2016).
http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&sw=w&u=cuny_gradctr
&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA326265128&asid=01e6b6da04de2343daa5a2d542820fe5.
63
Ibid.
64
Picketty, 515-539.
61
62

28

a downward pressure on inequality. However, there are assumptions at play here as well.
The US has some of the most accessible education in the world, yet has a high Gini
index. While often available, the quality of education is inconsistent, and even assuming
that we had equal, high quality education for all, where will these jobs exist in the globaltechno economy. Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee argue that technology has
created jobs that we did not have in the past. While the “computer” a person who
actually spent hours tallying numbers was replaced by the integrated circuit, we now have
the newly created position of data scientist that can analyze the new vast amounts of data
computers have been able to supply.65 It is a nice example, but so far neither the private
nor public sector has been able offset current trends in under/unemployment. According
to the World Economic Forum Report by the US White House, since 2010 the US
economy has been destroying more jobs than it has been creating, largely due to
automation. The study reports that you have an 83% chance of losing your job to
automation if you make $20 an hour or less, and a 31% chance if you make $21-$40 an
hour.66 Milanovic continues yet unconvincingly argues that dissipation of rents from the
exceptionally high growth sectors in the US may combat inequality and that global
income convergence may create a global equity that would allow individual states to
better address their own wealth disparities. His final speculative argument is that not all
technology will necessarily require high skill labor, but may actually be developed to
create a cost offset using low skilled labor.67 However, this argument has no basis in the
current economic climate where those with applicable skills are valued and thus often
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overworked. Of all these solutions progressive taxation is the least problematic. If the
global-techno restructuring of capitalism will produce the greatest wealth and
productivity, it will require the buy-in and political will of the citizenry. Of course a
Universal Basic Income could be a useful tool; current structures can remain unprotested
through the liberalization of transfer payments in a UBI.

Economies of the South
A veteran critic of “development” James Ferguson reveals a somewhat
unacknowledged trend in the march toward neoliberal global development, increases in
Conditional Cash Transfers in the global South.68 The idea of simply giving money to
the poor has evoked visceral reactions to those who see money as the product of work.
However, as Fergusson outlines in his book, more and more in Africa and around the
global South, development institutions such as the World Bank have been doing just that,
giving “free cash” to ever growing numbers of candidates. Governments have long been
in the business of balancing economic growth in the private sector with distribution. In
an age when productivity can guarantee basic human rights to necessities, Fergusson asks
us to shift our attention from production to the politics of distribution.
In Give a Man a Fish, Fergusson highlights the fundamental flaw in development
projects in the neoliberal global economy. The old proverb that values teaching a man to
fish over simply giving him one, assumes that the problem needing to be addressed is one
of knowledge or a lack thereof, rather than the lack of means, e.g. owning a boat.
Secondly and more importantly it specifies a problem of production, not being able to
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catch fish. If only the impoverished of a developing nation could partake in the
production of goods in exchange for a wage, they could emerge from their state of need.
But what if the real problem was not production? In fact, imagine there was already a
saturated labor market in the fishing industry and plenty of fish. Distribution is left out of
the equation; what the man simply needs is a fish. This simple analogy provides a clear
reflection for poverty and development needs in Southern Africa. While the symptoms
ring true for many “developing” states, Ferguson focuses on South Africa in particular as
a “paradigmatic case” of neoliberal policy.69
With hopes to secure the metaphorical fish for the largely unskilled labor force
that had been previously relegated to the “homelands”, South Africa’s post-apartheid
democratization provided a political climate that was amenable to the World Band and
IMF policies of deregulation and privatization. In what may appear symptomatic of
neoliberal progress, South Africa saw rising wealth inequality and surging
unemployment. However, reforms also included the end of race barriers for pensions and
social assistance programs took shape for the elderly or those with small children. Such
programs grew until today some 44% of South African households utilize some kind of
cash assistance, which accounts for roughly 3.4% of the nation’s GDP.70 Numerous
studies have shown that the benefits of the Conditional Cash Grants, CCGs, have been
positive, improving nutritional, educational outcomes and reducing extreme poverty;
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even middle incomes have increased.71 Other similar results were reported in Ghana and
Namibia.72
Though the stimulatory effects of the transfers are recognizable as “good old”
Keynesian economics, Ferguson distinguishes the CCGs from traditional welfare systems
of Northern states. Such programs in the “developing world” seem anachronistic to the
West, where social safety nets were a product of an advanced, industrial stage of growth.
However, the South African grants were not safety nets; they did not assume to fill a gap
in the employment history of an individual on hard times in an economy that assumed
full employment. They are non-contributory. Ferguson presents the idea of cash grants
as right of citizenship. Such a definition of citizenry is politically plausible in South
Africa as the majority of the population was historically dispossessed of the wealth of the
nation. As Ferguson points out, millions in South Africa alone have little relevance to
global capital. Still deserving of rights, they are a democratic force that will continue to
shape the politics of the nation.
In arguing for a UBI, Ferguson is troubled by leftist critiques of neoliberalism; he
prefers to focus on solutions rather than simply railing against neoliberalism. He is not
averse to employing neoliberal ideology in defense of UBI. Indeed a highly efficient
capitalist global economy may require a basic income. One of the chief arguments against
a basic income is the idea that government hand-outs create dependency, creating a
population dependent upon what Margaret Thatcher coined the “nanny state”. But
Ferguson promotes BI as a tool to combat dependency, describing it not as a safety net,
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but as a springboard. A minimum income can provide the insurance one needs to make
an entrepreneurial venture, freeing them from what could have been an unproductive but
safe low-wage job. As a universal grant, the unwieldy bureaucratic machine of a welfare
state could be streamlined into an efficiently effective and small form of government, a
far cry from the nanny state. Basic income, imagined as a right to share in the total
wealth of a nation, provides an alternative to the unintended forms of socialism.
Tendencies toward nationalization of industry have been the socialist reaction to the loss
of low-wage jobs, creating centralization of power which tends to depend on strong
central figures of authority that can must wield enough power to control markets, e.g.
Castro or Chavez. Ferguson imagines that BIGs not only effectively deal with
distribution issues, but the universal nature of the program eliminates excessive growth
and over-reach of the public sector.

The Experiments in the South
By 2008, the mechanisms that helped to establish conditions of inequality in
Southern Africa resulted in the experimental remedy of a basic income grant. While cash
grants are numerous and loosely regulated in South Africa, there is still one segment of
the population that is continually excluded, working age men.73 However, in a single
village in Namibia, the Basic Income Grant Coalition created the first universal cash
grant program experiment in Southern Africa. Namibia’s relatively recent transition to
independence has left it with the material reality of extreme wealth inequality, earning a
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Gini co-efficient of 0.6.74 Despite a growing GDP, the global economic restructuring has
left Namibian breadwinners largely unemployed, along with a youth unemployment rate
reaching over 75%.75 Though the initial proposal of a basic income came from the
Namibian government, the Basic Income Grant Coalition has led in implementing and
subsequently publishing detailed accounts of their experiment in the village settlement of
Otjivero. They are in effect the efficient cause of the creation and implementation of the
BIG in Namibia. Their work gives a clear history of the agents and institutions involved
in the work. The initial successes of the program have led Namibia’s Minister of Poverty
Eradication, Zephania Kameeta, to recently claim support for the Basic Income Grant as
an essential tool in achieving the ambitious goal of eliminating poverty by the year
2025.76 Namibia serves as a unique example of how cash transfers could be imagined in
redefining property relations in a neo-colonial state.
Specific structures and processes unique to Namibia inform the development of a
BIG program and its feasibility outside of southwest Africa. Namibia did not gain its
independence until 1990, following one-hundred years of apartheid-colonialism. In fact,
the initial colonization of what became known as German South-west Africa after the
Berlin Conference in 1884 is considered the first genocide of the 20th century. Many of
the perpetrators of the atrocities of the Third Reich found their origins in the ethnic
cleansing of the Herero and Namaqua people. The Herero War fulfilled the German need
for land as outlined in the Lebensraum Theory. In 1990, this history was clearly relevant
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as the white population, roughly five percent of the population, controlled over 70% of
the GDP while traditional lands were still largely in the hands of the minority population.
Sixteen years after independence, Namibians are still suffering. The Labour
Force Survey of 1997 revealed that 34.5% of Namibians who were willing and able to
work were unemployed. By 2008, this figure had risen to 51.2%. 77 The World Bank
considers Namibia to be an upper-middle income country with a GDP per capita income
of $4,700 US, yet according to a study conducted by the University of Port Elizabeth in
which poverty was assessed according to what a “basket” of essential goods needed for
household survival would look like, 82% of Namibians are living in poverty.78 A more
recognizable number, those living on less than $1 US a day, makes up 62% of the
population.79
Though wealth inequality was high, as was socialist the rhetoric, during its
transition to independence, Namibia took a measured approach to its independence,
focusing on equality through policies like “education for all” and avoiding nationalization
of industry.80 In many ways Namibia looked to neoliberal policies to heal its economic
deficiencies. The National Development Plan established in 1995 projected an annual
growth rate of five percent through attracting foreign direct investment, privatization of
public sector industry, development of merchant banks for local investment, elimination
of capital-gains tax, and a debt securities market.81 Growth rates did not meet the modest
goals of five percent, averaging closer to 3%. Despite a growing GDP, high levels of
77
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wealth inequality remained. Rather than question the effectiveness of such policies or the
inadequacies of neoliberal remedies in alleviating poverty, Namibia's President Sam
Nujoma blamed a lack of foreign investment for the stunted growth, pointing to the fact
that, "In 1996, of approximately $109.5 billion in net foreign direct investment in
emerging economies, only $2.6 billion was invested in Africa south of the Sahara."82
Such investment, curtailed by the human rights issues that continued to plague Namibia is
proposed to be the answer to inequality and poverty. Even with this neoliberal outlook, a
BIG can be seen as a means to secure economic rights as a stopgap measure until more
traditional means of economic development can take effect. However more importantly,
the BIG provides what global development schemes do not, a guaranteed right to
participate in the market and a foundation for endogenous growth.
The initial conception of a BIG in Namibia came from the government itself
through a progressive tax proposal, NAMTAX, which sought to guarantee every citizen
no less than $70 US a month. The idea was dropped, but taken up by the BIG Coalition,
a conglomeration of NGOs whose leadership was founded in the Evangelical Lutheran
Church in the Republic of Namibia, ELCRN. Rather than view a BIG as a hand-out that
would create dependence, Chairperson Bishop Dr. Zephania Kameeta was convinced that
it was, “…not only able to eradicate destitution, hunger and malnutrition, but that it lays a
strong foundation for economic empowerment, responsibility and ownership taking. The
BIG, by restoring the human dignity of people, frees people to become active and proud
members of society.”83 The BIG was seen by its creators as a human right as outlined in
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ICESCR and a way
82
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to uphold the Namibian Constitution. As the Namibian government, taking the advice of
the IMF, declined to implement a BIG. Therefore the BIG coalition set up the
experimental grant in the village of Otjivero, a rural community surrounded by foreignowned farms. It was a village plagued by crime, malnutrition, and poverty. Each
resident was afforded about $12 US a month, or about $.40 US a day. The administrative
costs were less than 10% of the total budget.
The results of the experiment are controversial; overcoming the biased criticisms
of the BIG, necessary for its implementation is no small task. The loudest critics say that
the published findings were simply too positive to be true. Herbert Jauch provides the
most seemingly unbiased assessment of the project. He supports the research of Rev. Dr.
Claudia Haarmann and her husband Rev. Dr. Dirk Haarmann, whom conducted the initial
research at Otjivero. Jauch’s findings show that rates of poverty, child malnutrition, and
school dropout rates fell substantially during the cash transfer experiment. He likewise
asserts that a bottom-up campaign is what will ultimately combat pressure from
international organizations like the IMF to establish a BIG in Namibia. The United
Nations Special Rapportuer on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdelena Sepulveda
also had strong praise to the effects of the program in her report to the UN in October of
2012, stating that she was, “impressed to witness the positive impacts of the Basic
Income Grant in reducing poverty, improving access to health and education, diminishing
crime and increasing social cohesion… …I commend the efforts of the Namibian civil
society organizations in initiating and implementing this project. I call on the
Government to put aside prejudices against people living in poverty and objectively
assess the positive impacts of this project. The Government should be leading the debate
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and undertaking studies on the viability of extending a Basic Income Grant throughout
the country.”84
A look at the opposition to BIGs can reveal some of the processes that prevented
the adoption of the program by the Namibian government. Of interest is the role of the
trade unions, the National Union of Nambian Workers (NUNW) and the Trade Union
Congress of Namibia (TUCNA). The rift between the leadership of the NUNW and the
workers reveal some insight into the political landscape of Namibia and general
contradictions in unions’ role in the universal eradication of poverty. The split of the
workers’ union helped to weaken the BIG Coalition’s aims of having a basic income
implemented by the State, as a basic income was not a stated goal of unions who rather
sought to protect labor rights and the interests of the employed. Other opposition
included criticisms of the BIG Coalition’s research from the Namibia Economic Policy
Research Institute. This is currently a defunct agency whose findings are questionable at
best. Likewise the IMF advised the Namibian government against implementation,
inflating the cost estimates.85 Was the opposition to the BIG simply a lack of
imagination? Union leaders seeking to support the interests of labor failed to perceive
how a BIG could support labor’s power to negotiate. International actors seemed to
view the program as a social safety net, rather than a springboard as described by
Ferguson.

Another tangential question lies in why German non-profits and churches were as
interested and involved as they were, even when local support was waning. With the
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resurrection and revision of the German Herero War, one must consider how much
influence such disturbing images from the past have on the desire of Germans to support
the poor of Namibia. A full account of the causal mechanisms of the BIG in Namibia
cannot ignore this appeal to the conscience. Even now Germany struggles with how to
apologize for the genocide of the early 20th century. Germany has taken steps to return
the remains of indigenous peoples who were at the time used for medical experiments in
Germany. Though Germany asserts that acknowledgement of past crimes will not lead to
reparations, the BIG could easily be understood, not simply as a path to social justice for
Namibians, but for the German conscience as well, at the very least for those of the
Evangelical Lutheran Church. Ferguson describes this as the Christian contribution to
the politics of distribution as he points out that Jesus actually did “give a man a fish”, a
miracle of distributive economics where two fishes and five loaves fed the multitude.
The results of the experiment in Otjivero were nearly as fantastic as the parable of
the fishes, drawing skepticism from biased critics; however, the benefits were clear.
Even before the cash transfers were made available, the BIG preparations led to the
village community coming together, exercising civic engagement and agency in
organizing the administration of the grants. Even though the total cash value of the grant
was well below the poverty line, making up about only a third the required income to
meet basic needs, poverty levels fell from 76% of households to 37%. Entrepreneurial
endeavors were stimulated as 14% of more households participated in income-generating
endeavors. Small businesses emerged that included brick making, dressmaking, and
baking. A local marketplace emerged for the exchange of goods and services. Overall
health improved, of children especially. Initially 42% of children were underweight but
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this number was reduced to 10% by the end of the experiment. Children also had the
ability to pay school fees and buy uniforms, leading to a marked decrease in the dropout
rate. Likewise more people took advantage of the health clinic. As seen by grants in
South Africa as well, even small cash grants can make the difference in being able to
afford the transportations costs to get to a clinic. Lastly, women were shown to be less
dependent upon their male counterparts for needs and less willing to sell sexual
services.86
The BIG program in Namibia therefore has served a variety of functions. It has
served as an effective tool in relieving hunger. It has put a kind of primitive capital into
the hands of those most disenfranchised by colonialism and its successor, neoliberalism,
stimulating entrepreneurship in the village of Objivero. Unlike microloans, which have
been widely accepted as legitimate free market programs, the BIG provided capital
within the community to patronize such entrepreneurial ventures, promoting an
industrious revolution. The BIG, devised as an emergency measure to deal with
insurmountable inequality from a history of dispossession, has the potential to alleviate
poverty while maintaining global economic structures that efficiently fuel global supply
chains. Disruptions to neoliberal institutions through nationalization of industry are
exchanged for a small share in the wealth of a nation, defining citizenship through
ownership, not simply as a civic actor. Socialist movements are thus limited through a
type of socialism that enables free agency in the free market. The streamlined nature of
the program does not require large powerful public institutions. For a small price,
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roughly 5% of the Namibian GDP, first world consciences are eased and global
capitalism survives.

Imagining Basic Income in the US
James Livingston would point out that the fastest growing sector of the United
States economy in the last thirty years is that of transfer payments. We can find a number
of examples of how socialism continues to grow in the US despite the continued call for
smaller government, privatization, etc. If we make the distinction between socialism and
capitalism as described by Van Parijs, we can simply look to the public or private
ownership of capital and the means to production.87 Currently federal outlays account for
more than 20% of US GDP, averaging 20.3% since 1967. According to the OECD, total
federal, state, and local spending reached 6.6 trillion in 2014.88 Federal spending and the
resulting debt have been used to stimulate the economy, the result being bloated budgets
consisting mainly of social security, Medicare/Medicaid, and military spending. To
reduce public sector spending would be politically unwise as the resulting shrinkage of
GDP would be at least temporarily painful. Not since Regan and Volker has the Fed
been willing to initiate a recessionary trend. The point being that the pressure of growth
creates, in even the most pro-capitalist economy, socialist trends in distribution. Those
that lose out in the distribution of wealth find themselves presented with few options.
One can join the military and, for the small risk of losing one’s life, can have access to a
distribution of capital through a wage and training. Unfortunately as pointed out by
87

Philippe Van Parij, "Real freedom for all: What (if anything) can Justify Capitalism?"
(OUP Catalogue:1997).
88
OECD, accessed 26 November 2016,
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SNA_TABLE11.
41

Michelle Alexander in The New Jim Crow, many Americans of color find themselves in
the worst form of socialist institutions, prison. The cost of prisons in the roughly forty
sates studied by the Vera Institute of Justice, which included costs not always reflected in
states’ budgets, was roughly 40 billion. Imagining the US for what is really is, a mixed
economy, will allow for a more balanced approach in addressing what constitutes the
publics sector’s role in distribution.

Basic Income as an American Ideal
Finding common ground politically in the current bipartisan climate may be a
fool’s errand, especially concerning a scheme of basic income that many view simply as
a free lunch. However, the history of Basic Income in the US shows us that it has found
support among a wide swath of ideologies from libertarianism to progressive liberalism.
Some argue that BI is a rightful outgrowth of the very Enlightenment principles the
nation was founded upon. The rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
embodied in the Declaration of Independence refers to equality in the accumulation of
capital, or as Locke would prefer, property. Locke’s labor theory of value shows that
through labor, the value of property can grow 10-fold, a 100-fold, and even a 1000-fold.89
It is the distribution of property itself that enters man into a civil contract. While Locke’s
theories warranted best use practices that justified the dissolution of Native American
property rights and allowed for a distinction between classes of propertied and nonpropertied citizens, Thomas Paine imagined a citizenship that included natural rights to
the general wealth of the land. He saw property rights as not only the key to the
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production of wealth, but of poverty as well. He states, “Cultivation is at least one of the
greatest natural improvements ever made by human invention. It has given to created
earth a tenfold value. But the landed monopoly that began with it has produced the
greatest evil. It has dispossessed more than half the inhabitants of every nation of their
natural inheritance, without providing for them, as ought to have been done, an
indemnification for that loss, and has thereby created a species of poverty and
wretchedness that did not exist before.”90 Paine’s solution was a land rent of fifteen
pounds sterling that was paid to all citizens upon their twenty-first birthday and an
additional ten pounds per annum, providing them the initial capital needed to avoid
poverty in a “civilized” society. Paine saw private ownership of property as key to
improvements, creating the basis for advances in the arts and sciences, yet he maintains
that in a natural state, that before the new social property relations of capitalism,
everyone would have had equal access to the land. Therefore in “civilized” society a
natural right has been taken away without recompense. He did not describe his
guaranteed income as an aid to the poor to relieve poverty but as a right of citizenship.
Martin Luther King’s advocacy for economic justice included a call for a basic
income. Though his calls for economic equanimity are largely thought to have come
towards the end of his career, one may want to consider the fact that the “I Have a
Dream” speech was originally titled, “The March for Freedom and Jobs”.91 Here we find
a commonality between the US and Southern Africa in economic equality as a remedy for
the grievances of a history of dispossession. In his book, Where Do We Go From Here,
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Martin Luther King chooses to not delineate between the poor whites and poor blacks in
the US, noting that there are twice as many poor whites in his day. He is critical of
welfare-state policies that attempt to address social ills through piecemeal programs.
Educational reforms, affordable housing, and family counseling had been uncoordinated
in their efforts and thus ineffective. King is able to describe the structural issues in the
economy describing a world in which production has outpaced wages, a world were too
many are unable to participate in the consumption of said goods. He outlines two
answers, either full employment or guaranteed incomes. He states, “I’m now convinced
that the simplest approach will prove to be the most effective- the solution to poverty is to
abolish it directly by a now widely discussed measure, the guaranteed income.”92 In the
age of ever growing identity politics, it may be that a universal income is a way to heal
the inequalities of the past, from those whose ancestors were enslaved to those who were
simply property-less, providing reparations without the specter of partisanship and latent
racism.
King was accurate in his appraisal of the popularity of a basic income. Milton
Friedman had proposed a form of basic income, the negative income tax, in his 1962
book, Capitalism and Freedom. Freidman saw the welfare state as in inefficient
bureaucratic model. He was convinced that instead of providing a safety net, government
could effectively eliminate welfare through a tax code that provides a minimum basic
income.93 Even libertarian economist and Nobel-Prize winning economist F.A. Hayek
wrote, “There is no reason why in a free society government should not assure to all,
protection against severe deprivation in the form of an assured minimum income, or a
92
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floor below which nobody need descend.”94 By 1972 a basic income bill was passed in
the House and was on track to become law of the land under Nixon, when the Senate
voted it down.

The Northern Experiments
A New York Times article from 1970 reveals how Nixon was informed that the
antipoverty experiment in basic income in northern New Jersey and Pennsylvania
supported his welfare reform plan. The director of the Office of Economic Opportunity
at the time, Donald Rumsfeld oversaw the concluding experiment that had begun during
the Johnson Administration’s “War on Poverty”. The goal of the report was to measure
the impact on labor productivity in light of a guaranteed income. The plan was similarly
structured to Milton Friedman’s negative income tax in an effort to combat welfare
dependency. Incentives to work were compromised under the current program of the
day, as a dollar raise in pay could jeopardize more than a dollar in subsidy. The families
subsidized by Rumsfeld’s experiment were guaranteed a basic income of $1,600 per year.
However, every dollar earned above $720, the subsidy was reduced by only $.50. The
initial finding reported in the New York Times, just ten months into the three-year plan,
were positive. 53% percent of those earning the subsidy increased their overall output as
measured by earnings, 18% of participants saw no change, and for 29% earning declined.
Compared to the control group, those receiving the subsidy were actually slightly more
productive. In addition, the administrative cost of the program ranged from $72 to $96
per family, far below the $300 per family as witnessed by the welfare programs of the
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time.95 When the proposal for the welfare reform failed in the Senate, rather than
pushing for his agenda, Nixon was eventually convinced by sociologist Polanyi that the
scheme was untenable. Polanyi based his conclusions on what was perhaps one of the
first basic income experiments in the new social property relations of the industrial world,
that of the “Speenhamland system”. This relief entitlement program in Berkshire County,
England and its questionable interpretations has helped to support those who claim moral
objection to a free lunch. The Royal Commission Report of 1834 which informed the
New Poor Laws, cited indolence, sloth, and immorality as products of the aid.96 Such
sentiments have been persistent and are perhaps best summed up in current political
ideology by Justice Clarence Thomas’ reaction to a welfare mom in the US, stating, “She
gets mad when the mailman is late with her welfare check. That’s how dependent she is.
What’s worse is that now her kids feel entitled to the check, too. They have no
motivation for doing better or getting out of that situation.”97 However, the findings of
the New Jersey experiment and other basic income initiatives provide some of the first
scientific analysis, unburdened by biases drawn from moralizations of work.
A more detailed report on the New Jersey Income Maintenance Experiment was
published during the second year of the project. By looking to the second year of the
three year experiment, one hopes to find the most accurate reflection of the effects of a
guaranteed income as the first and last years may influence family decision making as
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one is adjusting to the new income or coming to terms with the fact the income would be
ending soon. The total hours worked per week by family fell by 11.8% but the average
earnings per hour rose by 9.8% with the total earning decreasing by 3.2%.98 While male
heads of households worked fewer hours, they made more per hour and had a .9%
increase in earnings. Earners other than the father or mother in the household saw the
sharpest decreases in earnings at -22.8%. Overall, it became clear that total productivity
per household was small, though at a national scale, 3.2% could be significant. However,
what is not revealed in the numbers is the value of human capital or domestic capital.
Household production has always been an important, if hard to measure, contribution as
described by deVries and his Z-commodities. For example, “other earners” or non-heads
of households saw their earning decrease. This is not necessarily problematic as “other
earners” would be able to focus on valuable non-earning endeavors such as education.
What is most striking about the finding is that the average earning per hour for all
members of the household increased by at least 7%. Here we see, as in the experiment in
Namibia, that a minimum income contributed to a freedom in finding better work.
The New Jersey Income Maintenance program was just one of five negative
income tax experiments in North America during the 70s. Others included a program in
North Carolina and Iowa that focused on rural populations, one in Gary, Indiana that
sought to study the effects for single mothers, another in Seattle and Denver, SIME and
DIME, which consisted of the largest populations, and finally an experiment in the
Canadian town of Dauphin that was completely universal in its disbursement. While all
the programs, including the New Jersey experiment, were firstly concerned with the labor
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supply response to a guaranteed income, the data was also used to study effects on what
we might call human capital. Again the labor response was minimal, though many at the
time would argue that any response at all was simply unacceptable on principle.
Elementary aged children in the North Carolina experiment performed better on exams.99
Dropout rates fell among those participating in the New Jersey experiment. The SIME
and DIME programs saw an increase in continuing education for adults. The birth weight
of children born to single mothers of the Gary experiment increased.100 In Canada,
Dauphin saw a decrease in the birth rate, fewer hospitalizations and of shorter duration.101
The psychological motivations to work would be a useful study in understanding the
effects of basic income, but are beyond the scope of this paper. However, what we have
learned from economic history and the negative income tax experiments is that
populations are inherently concerned with improving the quality of their lives. Labor
saving technology, be it in industry or in the household has failed to produce excess
leisure, but instead has allowed for more people to raise their standard of living.102 In the
experiments of the 1970s we see that while secondary earners decreased their hours in the
labor force, it was replaced by household production or human capital. Education in
particular benefitted from the freedom allotted by the experiments.103
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Conclusion
From the experiments in guaranteed income and negative income tax, it is clear
that BI can serve to “raise all boats” while causing little disruption to the current global
economic structures. Imagining distributive economics will be key in the survival of
capitalism through providing controlled, non-disruptive alternatives to unintended
socialist tendencies. Rather than creating scenarios of dependency, the BI has shown to
promote the free market ideals of liberty, social mobility, and individual initiative; one,
by providing a remedy for the so-called welfare-gap, and secondly by providing the basic
accumulation of working capital to support endogenous growth, even promoting civic
engagement. The same structures that have produced the greatest growth in wealth have
perpetuated increases in inequality both internationally and domestically through an
unbalanced focus on production for the global marketplace. Such a vision has provided
examples of successful and often unsuccessful transitions to capitalist growth. Therefore
neoliberal policies focused on devaluation and production should be balanced with
domestic consumer demand and markets. The successes of the US since the beginning of
the 20th century were not the product of some kind of libertarian free market utopia, but
the clear concerted efforts through political means to shape a liberal corporate capitalist
structure to combat the unsavory aspects of free market competition e.g., overproduction.
The speculative nature of capital has been fueled by the success of corporate capitalism
with a clear cost carried by the American middle class and the poor of the developing
world, as US economic imperialism “cannibalized” its domestic interests for goals of the
State Department and later Wall Street. If one looks to history for answers, successful
alleviation of poverty has required, strong wages, consumer demand, the ability of labor
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to negotiate, primitive accumulation and social, political, and cultural structures to
administer markets. As seen in the experiments, BI can serve as a tool to address such
needs. Likewise, as seen in the South and as advocated by Dr. Martin Luther King, and
even Thomas Paine, UBI can provide reparations for histories of dispossession without
the corresponding conflicts of identity politics. It reduced poverty well beyond the cash
value of the grant, indicating a stimulatory effect for local economies. Such effects were
evident in the expansion of local markets and improvements in health and education. The
slight decrease in household contribution to the labor market was replaced by freedom in
expanding “household” or “human” capital, leading to expanded choice in household
determination in quality of life choices. The added leverage allowed for households to
secure better jobs. Imagining a UBI may be uncomfortable at first, but given the
potential for global instability, it may simply be the least disruptive mechanism in
preserving global capitalist structures.
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